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Available online 24 March 2007A discourse context provides a reader with a great deal of information that can provide
constraints for further language processing, at several different levels. In this experiment we
used event-related potentials (ERPs) to explore whether discourse-generated contextual
constraints are based on the precise message of the discourse or, more ‘loosely’, on the
scenario suggested by one or more content words in the text. Participants read constraining
stories whose precise message rendered a particular word highly predictable (“Themanager
thought that the board of directors should assemble to discuss the issue. He planned a…
[meeting]”) as well as non-constraining control stories that were only biasing in virtue of the
scenario suggested by some of the words (“The manager thought that the board of directors
need not assemble to discuss the issue. He planned a…”). Coherent words that were
inconsistent with the message-level expectation raised in a constraining discourse (e.g.,
“session” instead of “meeting”) elicited a classic centroparietal N400 effect. However, when
the samewords were only inconsistent with the scenario loosely suggested by earlier words
in the text, they elicited a different negativity around 400 ms, with a more anterior, left-
lateralized maximum. The fact that the discourse-dependent N400 effect cannot be reduced
to scenario-mediated priming reveals that it reflects the rapid use of precise message-level
constraints in comprehension. At the same time, the left-lateralized negativity in non-
constraining stories suggests that, at least in the absence of strong message-level
constraints, scenario-mediated priming does also rapidly affect comprehension.





Over the last two decades, event-related potentials (ERPs) have
considerably advanced our understanding of the cognitive
processes underlying language comprehension. The N400, an
ERP component that is particularly sensitive to semantic
processing, has played a major role in this. The N400 has been).
er B.V. All rights reservedused to study the comprehension of written, spoken and
signed language (see Kutas et al. (2006) for review), as well as
the breakdown of language or of related cognitive functions in,
for example, aphasia (Hagoort et al., 1996; Swaab et al., 1997),
schizophrenia (Sitnikova et al., 2002), and Alzheimer's disease
(Ford et al., 1996). The N400 component was discovered by
Kutas and Hillyard (1980), who found that a sentence-final.
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context evoked a larger negativity than a congruent ending.
Later experiments showed that the N400 was more than a
semantic anomaly detector. In particular, relative to highly
expected words, semantically coherent but unexpected words
also evoked a larger N400, albeit not as large as anomalies
(Kutas and Hillyard, 1984). Based on these and other findings,
Kutas and colleagues (2006) have recently argued that the
amplitude of the N400 reflects the degree to which “context
aids in the interpretation of a potentially meaningful stimu-
lus.” In line with this, language researchers generally agree
that theword-elicited N400 indexes howwell themeaning of a
word fits the constraints set by the context (Chwilla et al.,
1995; Coulson and Federmeier, in press; Friederici, 1995;
Hagoort et al., 2004; Osterhout and Holcomb, 1995; Van
Berkum et al., 1999, 2003).
But what are those constraints? Following up on the
pioneering N400 research of St. George et al. (1994), ERP
experiments with text-level manipulations suggest that the
N400 is not only sensitive to constraints provided by a single
word prime or an unfolding single sentence, but is also
highly sensitive to what the wider discourse is about
(Federmeier and Kutas, 1999b; Nieuwland and Van Berkum,
2006; St George et al., 1997; Van Berkum et al., 1999, 2003,
2005). In stories such as (1), for example, the discourse-
supported word “movie” elicited a much smaller N400 than
the discourse-inappropriate word “book” (Van Berkum et al.,
1999, 2003). Such discourse-dependent N400 effects have
been interpreted as evidence that the language comprehen-
sion system immediately evaluates the current word against
a precise message-level representation of what has been said
so far.
(1) David and Sabrina had been thinking about what they were
going to do that evening, and eventually decided to go to the
cinema. They hoped the movie/book would be fun, but it turned
out to be quite boring.
However, an important alternative interpretation has as
yet not been ruled out. Models of text comprehension and
memory suggest that in addition to contributing to a precise
message-level representation of the discourse, the words in a
text can also provide semantic constraints in a much less
precise way, via the activation of related information stored in
long-term memory (Kintsch, 1988; McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992;
Sanford, 1990). In the above story, for instance, the mere
presence of the word “cinema” could activate a going-to-the-
movies scenario, which includes seeing a film. The attenua-
tion of the N400 in (1) might thus also come about because the
word “movie” is relevant to the scenario suggested by one or
several words in the preceding text.
The difference between a message-level and scenario-
mediated account for discourse-dependent N400 effects may
not be obvious at first. After all, our understanding of what has
been said so far, the precise message, will in part depend on
our default knowledge about what things tend to go together
in the world (as captured in scenarios, scripts, etc.). However,
consider what would happen if we change the precise
message of the discourse, as in (2). Although the going-to-
the-movies-scenario is still implied by the words in thecontext, the actual message of the story does not really
support either “movie” or “book”
(2) David and Sabrina had been thinking about what they were
going to do that evening, and eventually decided not to go to the
cinema. They hoped the movie/book would be out on dvd soon,
and went to the pub.
In the ERP study reported below, we try to disentangle the
effects of message- and scenario-level constraints by exploit-
ing the possibility to change the message of a story while
leaving the scenario-relevant words in that story intact. The
goal is to examine whether the discourse-dependent N400
effect hinges on constraints provided by the exact message-
level representation of the prior text (as assumed in Van
Berkum et al., 1999, 2003), or whether it can perhaps be
accounted for – entirely or in part – by scenario-mediated
lexical priming.
Behavioral experiments have shown that this scenario-
mediated priming does play a role in comprehension, and can
do so even when the scenario-generated information is
irrelevant to, or at odds with, the actual message (Duffy et al.,
1989; Garrod and Terras, 2000; O'Seaghdha, 1997). Garrod and
Terras (2000), for example, showed that the word “pen” is ini-
tially just as effectively integrated when presented in a
sentence following “The teacher wrote a letter” as it is after
the sentence “The teacher wrote the exercise on the black-
board”. Only in regression path analysis and second pass
reading times a significant difference was observed between
the appropriate and inappropriate contextual message. This
indicates that participants did not at first notice the message-
level incongruence of “pen”, presumably because “pen” is
strongly associated with the default scenario activated by the
verb (“to write”). Results like these imply that contextually
activated scenarios can prime scenario-related concepts, lead-
ing to facilitated processing of these concepts and the words
that denote them. Furthermore, they show that scenario-
related facilitation is in some cases initially stronger than the
support provided by the actual message of the discourse.
To account for such results, models of text comprehension
(Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Sanford and Garrod, 1981, 1998) usually
include an initial stage in which all potentially relevant
information is retrieved in a way that is highly sensitive to
the set of words and concepts in the text, regardless of the
precise message of the text. For example, the scenario-
mapping and focus theory of Sanford and Garrod (1981, 1998)
proposes that the word currently read or heard (e.g., “movie”)
is initially evaluated in terms of a ‘quick and dirty’ match to
prior words in the text and the scenario suggested by those
words, before it is mapped more carefully onto the precise
message conveyed by that text. Kintsch (1988, 1998) has made
similar proposals. The dominant model for the relatively
shallow initial retrieval process involved in these accounts is
the resonance model (Cook et al., 1998; Myers and O' Brien, 1998;
Myers et al., 1994). According to this model, individual
concepts from the linguistic input send out a signal to long-
term memory. Concepts in memory then resonate as a
function of their relatedness to the input, based on the overlap
between the semantic and contextual features of the concepts
involved. Eventually, those concepts that have the highest
Table 1 – Example of the stimulus materials
Message- and scenario-biased discourse
Bias-consistent noun Bias-inconsistent noun
The manager thought that the
board of directors should
assemble to discuss the issue.
He planned a meeting where the
staff members involved would
be present as well.
The manager thought that the
board of directors should
assemble to discuss the issue.
He planned a session where
the staff members involved
would be present as well.
Scenario-biased discourse
Bias-consistent noun Bias-inconsistent noun
The manager thought that the
board of directors need not
assemble to discuss the issue.
He planned a meeting where the
staff members involved would
be present and nobody else.
The manager thought that the
board of directors need not
assemble to discuss the issue.
He planneda sessionwhere the
staff members involved would
be present and nobody else.
An approximate English translation of one of the stories shown to
the participants, in all four conditions. The critical nouns are
printed in boldface.
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process is assumed to be fast acting and autonomous (or
“dumb” (Myers and O' Brien, 1998)). As a result, activated
information in long-term memory can be irrelevant to the
specific meaning conveyed by the complete discourse, and
may in fact even be incongruent with that message.
In a recent ERP experiment, Hoeks et al. (2004) directly
compared the effects of message-level constraint and scenario
fit on the N400 by contrasting the ERP evoked by a scenario-
related verb in a highly constraining sentence like “The javelin
was by the athletes thrown” (approximate translation from
Dutch) and inamuch less constraining sentence like “The javelin
has the athletes thrown.” In spite of the difference in message,
both sentences induce the same athletics scenario due to the
presence of related words (“javelin”, “athletes”) in the context.
Surprisingly, theN400 toscenario-relatedverbswas independent
of whether the actual message of the context supported or
prohibited this verb. This result suggests that the N400 is
sensitive to the effects of scenario fit, and that these scenario
effects canunder someconditions fully determine theamplitude
of this component, at least in the early stages of comprehension.
If the N400 is indeed as sensitive to scenario fit as the
results of Hoeks et al. (2004) suggest, this has important
consequences for the functional interpretation of the N400,
but also for the interpretation of experiments in which the
N400 is used as a measure of message-level semantic
integration or contextual facilitation. More specifically, if the
N400 elicited by words in text is (also) dependent on scenario-
based constraints, then differential N400 effects cannot be
automatically taken as an indication that the words at hand
are differentially integrated with a message-level representa-
tion of the text. As already discussed, this ambiguity affects
the interpretation of discourse-dependent N400 effects, and
we focus our experiment on this type of effect. However,
consistent with the account given for discourse-dependent
N400 effects in Van Berkum et al. (1999, 2003), the ambiguity
also affects the interpretation of sentence-dependent N400
effects, such as for those elicited by, e.g., “He mailed the letter
without a stamp” or “She locked the valuables in the safe”
(Kutas and Hillyard, 1984). As with longer texts, it is not clear
whether attenuated N400 effects in sentences like these
reflect support from the precise message, or from the general
scenario suggested by, say, “mailed” and “letter”.
In our experiment, we examined whether the discourse-
induced N400 effect results from a mismatch between the
incoming word and the specific constraints set by the precise
message of the discourse, or whether this N400 effect reflects
scenario-based fit. We roughly followed the logic embodied in
examples (1) and (2), avoiding semantic anomalies, since
semantically congruent words that differ in sentence- or
discourse-based predictability can also elicit a large differen-
tial N400 effect (DeLong et al., 2005; Hagoort and Brown, 1994;
Kutas and Hillyard, 1984; Van Berkum et al., 2005).
Table 1 shows the two types of stories used in the
experiment. In the so-called message- and scenario-biased (or
MS-biased) story, the text leading up to the critical word has a
highly constraining message, such that when people are asked
to complete the story in a cloze test they predominantly
converge on “meeting”, and very rarely come up with the
equally congruent word “session”. This predictability criticallyhinges on the prior discourse supplied by the preceding
sentence (Van Berkum et al., 2005).
Next, because the discourse-dependent attenuation of the
N400 for a word like “meeting” might also be caused by its
support from the meeting-scenario suggested by the indivi-
dual words in the MS-biased story quoted in Table 1 like
“manager”, “board”, “directors”, “assemble” and “discuss”, we
created the so-called scenario-biased (or S-biased) control stories.
In these stories, we changed the precise message of the first
sentence such that neither of the two critical words (nor any
other word) was particularly predictable. At the same time, we
made sure to preserve the scenario-relevant content words of
their MS-biased counterparts (e.g., “manager”, “board”, “direc-
tors”, “assemble” and “discuss”), so that these S-biased control
stories would remind people of the same scenario.
If thediscourse-dependentN400effect is solelya resultof the
mismatch between the incoming word and a precise message-
level representation of the discourse, then the N400 effect
elicited by MS-biased stories should not be elicited in S-biased
stories. Alternatively, if the discourse-dependent N400 effect
hinges solely on fit to the scenario induced by a set of content
words, the N400 effect elicited by MS-biased stories should be
comparable to the one elicited in S-biased stories. Of course, to
the extent that the precise message conveyed by the discourse
and thescenario inducedbyaset ofwords in thatdiscourseboth
affect the N400, both types of stories should evoke an N400
effect. However, in this case the N400 effect for S-biased stories,
where only the scenario supports the bias-consistent word,
should be smaller than the N400 effect observed in MS-biased
stories, in which the bias-consistent word is supported by both
the scenario and the message of the story.2. Results
Fig. 1 shows for each electrode the ERPs evoked by the bias-
consistent (solid line) and bias-inconsistent (dotted line) word
Fig. 1 – Message- and scenario-biased discourse. Grand average ERPs elicited by the critical nouns in a MS-biased discourse.
The solid waveforms represent the response to bias-consistent target nouns; the dotted waveforms represent responses to
bias-inconsistent target nouns.
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words in the S-biased condition. As can be seen in Fig. 1,
semantically coherent words that are not what would be
expected given the highly constraining message of the
discourse so far elicit a clear N400 effect, relative to coherent
expected words. However, Fig. 2 reveals that the same bias-
inconsistent words also evoke a negativity in the N400 latency
range when the discourse is only biasing through a related
scenario, while the actual message is not constraining. Fig. 3
shows the difference waves (ERP for inconsistent words−ERP
for consistent words) for the MS-biased (solid line) and the S-
biased discourse (dotted line), together with the scalp topo-
graphies of the bias inconsistency effect between 300 and 500
ms for the two context conditions. What can be seen here is
that, whereas the bias inconsistency effect in MS-biased
stories has a typical N400 distribution (a centroparietal and
slightly right-lateralized maximum), the effect in S-biased
stories has a very different scalp distribution, with a more
anterior, left-central maximum.
The overall Context×Consistency ANOVA on mean ampli-
tudes in the 300–500 ms latency range reveals a significant
main effect of Consistency (F(1,35)=11.7; p=0.002), with
inconsistent words evoking a larger negativity than consistent
words, and a main effect of Context (F(1,35)=5.4, p=0.03),
which is a result of a larger negativity for words presented in aMS-biased discourse than a S-biased discourse, regardless of
the nature of the word (consistent or inconsistent).
In spite of the difference in overall effect size visible in Fig. 3,
the Consistency×Context interaction in the overall ANOVA was
not significant (F(1,35)=1.6, p=0.22). However, the difference in
effect distributionwas statistically corroborated, after scaling the
data, by a reliable Consistency×Context×Electrode interaction
(F(29,1015)=2.4, p=0.04) in the overall ANOVA, as well as a
reliable Consistency×Context×Hemisphere interaction (F(1,35)=
8.0, p=0.008) in the quadrant ANOVA. Follow-up tests on the
unscaleddata indicated thatwhereas the twoconsistency effects
did not reliably differ over the left hemisphere (F(1,35)=0.4,
p=0.54), they did differ over the right hemisphere (F(1,35)=4.6,
p=0.04). Further simple main effects analyses revealed a reliable
negativity over the left hemisphere in the MS-biased condition
(F(1,35)=5.9, p=0.020) as well as the S-biased condition (F(1,35)=
5.6, p=0.023), but a reliable negativity over the right hemisphere
in the MS-biased condition only (F(1,35)=10.7, p=0.002), and not
in the S-biased condition (F(1,35)=1.8, p=0.19).3. Discussion
We examined whether word-elicited N400 effects within a
coherent discourse are solely determined by constraints set by
Fig. 2 – Scenario-biased discourse. Grand average ERPs elicited by the critical nouns in an S-biased discourse. The solid
waveforms, represent the response to bias-consistent target nouns; the dotted waveforms represent responses to
bias-inconsistent target nouns.
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activated scenario. In an MS-biased discourse, where both the
message of the discourse and the invoked scenario supported
a specific noun, critical words that were inconsistent with
these biases indeed elicited a larger N400 than the completely
consistent critical word. However, in the S-biased discourse,
where the consistentwordwas only supported by the scenario
suggested by one or more content words in the text, bias-
inconsistent words also elicited an increased negativity
around 400 ms, now with a more anterior, left-lateralized
maximum. The fact that the discourse-dependent N400 effect
cannot be reduced to scenario-mediated priming reveals that
it reflects the rapid use of precisemessage-level constraints in
comprehension. At the same time, the presence of a residual
left-dominant negativity in S-biased stories suggests that, at
least in the absence of strong message-level constraints,
scenario-mediated priming does also rapidly affect compre-
hension. We discuss both implications in turn, and then
discuss their possible relation.
3.1. A message-based discourse-level N400 effect
In MS-biased stories designed to generate specific word
expectations, coherent words that did not meet those
expectations elicited a classic N400 effect, peaking at 400 ms,andwith a centroparietal, slightly right-lateralizedmaximum.
As suggested by Fig. 3, this effect cannot be explained by
scenario-mediated (or other word-based ‘non-message’) prim-
ing, for when themessage-level constraintwas removedwhile
all potentially scenario-relevant words were still present (as in
S-biased control stories), the same critical words no longer
elicited a classic N400 effect. Although critical words in S-
biased control stories also gave rise to a negativity, its very
different scalp distribution implies that the N400 effect
observed in MS-biased stories at least partly reflects other
processes than those induced by scenario consistency. Since
the two types of stories only systematically differ in the
precise message and its degree of predictability, the N400
effect observed in MS-biased stories must reflect, at least in
part, the impact of message-level constraints.
This result supports earlier claims (Nieuwland and Van
Berkum, 2006; St George et al., 1994; Van Berkum et al., 1999,
2003) that comprehenders immediately relate the meaning of
every incoming word to a precise message-level representa-
tion of the wider discourse so far. That is, comprehension is
incremental all the way up to the level that matters most:
what the story or conversation is about. Note that earlier
reports on discourse-dependent N400 effects invariably relied
on semantic anomalies (the only earlier study in which
discourse-dependent cloze differences also elicited an N400
Fig. 3 – Differencewaves formessage and scenario and scenario-biased discourses. The differencewaves depicted here result
from subtracting the ERP elicited by bias-consistent targets from the ERP evoked by bias-inconsistent targets. Solid waveforms
represent the difference wave for the MS-biased discourse; dotted waveforms represent the difference wave for the S-biased
discourse. Also shown are the scalp distributions for the effect of bias consistency in each of the two conditions.
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cleanly manipulate N400-relevant cloze probabilities; Van
Berkum et al., 2005). In the present study a discourse-
dependent N400 was elicited by acceptable but unexpected
words, which were thus not anomalous. This is entirely
consistent with the fact that subtle cloze manipulations can
also induce N400 effects in coherent single sentences (DeLong
et al., 2005; Hagoort and Brown, 1994; Kutas and Hillyard,
1984).
3.2. The effect of scenario fit
As just discussed, the data show that the discourse-
dependent N400 effect cannot be reduced to mere differ-
ences in scenario fit: the actual message of the discourse istaken into account when evaluating new information.
However, when the message of the discourse was not
particularly constraining, as is the case in the S-biased
discourse, bias-inconsistent words still evoked a differential
negativity in the N400 time window. The difference in scalp
distribution for the two effects after normalization shows
that the negativity in the S-biased condition is not just a
smaller version of the standard N400 effect present in the
MS-biased discourse. As a result, the negativity in the S-
biased condition cannot be uniquely attributed to the small
remaining difference in cloze value between the scenario-
consistent and the scenario-inconsistent word.
But how then should we interpret this unexpected effect
related to scenario bias? The timing and polarity of the effect
are in line with a modulation of the classic N400, but whereas
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centroparietal maximum (Curran et al., 1993; Johnson and
Hamm, 2000; Kutas and Van Petten, 1994; Osterhout and
Holcomb, 1995), the current effect has a more anterior left-
lateralized maximum. This distribution resembles the scalp
topography of the left anterior negativity or LAN (Coulson et
al., 1998; Friederici et al., 1996; Gunter et al., 1997; Osterhout
and Mobley, 1995). LAN components, however, are related to
morphosyntactic violations, whereas the critical manipula-
tion in the present design is purely lexical–semantic. A more
appealing explanation for this might therefore be that the
observed scenario-related negativity recruits some (but clearly
not all) of the neuronal generators that also underlie the
classic N400 effect. This is in line with the observed
similarities in timing and polarity for the MS- and S-related
effects. Such an account would suggest that scenario-based
priming lies at the basis of the classic N400 as well, but that it
is not the only factor that determines the fit of incoming
semantic information.1
Apart from this, the mere fact that scenario-based differ-
ences in support for particular words elicit a left-lateralized
central negativity, instead of a classic N400 effect, may have
an interesting additional implication for language research on
(or with) the N400. Although researchers agree that the word-
elicited N400 indexes how well the meaning of a word fits the
constraints set by the context, there is disagreement over
whether N400 context effects reflect contextual modulations
of the ease of lexical information retrieval (Federmeier et al.,
2000), whether they instead directly reflect the compositional
processes involved inmaking sense of language (i.e., semantic
integration or ‘unification’ (Chwilla et al., 1995; Hagoort et al.,
2004; Van Berkum et al., 1999, 2003)), or whether they perhaps
necessarily reflect both because the two aspects cannot be
meaningfully separated (Coulson and Federmeier, in press). It
seems that only a perspective that includes message-level
semantic integration as a critical component can account for
our current findings. An account in which the word-elicited
N400 purely indexes lexical retrieval (and contextual modula-
tions thereof) cannot easily explain why, in our study,
differences in scenario-based (or other word-based priming)
support for a critical word do not modulate the classic,
centroparietal N400.
One thing that is important to note is that it is difficult to
separate scenario fit from simple “intra-lexical” word–word
priming. In the example story in Table 1, the scenario-biased
context also contains words that in isolation would be a
moderate to strong prime for the consistent word. Since it
has often been shown that individually presented primes do
not exert a facilitative effect over intervening words or longer
SOAs (>700 ms) (Masson, 1995; Neely, 1977; Neely, 1991;
Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988, 1995), it seems unlikely that the
N400 effect observed in natural language utterance (where1 The fact that violations of message- and scenario-level
constraints engage (at least partially) nonoverlapping neuronal
systems might also be related to findings that the two hemi-
spheres are differentially sensitive to the different levels of
contextual constraint, as is apparent from divided visual field
studies (Atchley et al., 1999; Beeman et al., 1994; Chiarello et al.,
2000; Faust, 1998; Faust and Gernsbacher, 1996) and ERP research
(Coulson et al., 2005).related words are usually separated by time and intervening
words) is dependent on strict single-word priming. Kutas and
colleagues have shown that within a sentential context,
incongruent words that are related to the contextually
expected target also evoke an attenuated N400 (Federmeier
and Kutas, 1999a,b; Kutas and Hillyard, 1984). This was taken
to imply that N400 amplitude serves as an index of relative
priming by words present in context. However, taking into
account the fuzzy boundary between word–word priming
and scenario-based priming, this effect could just as well be
ascribed to scenario-based priming. Previous research there-
fore does not support a conclusion that all effects of
scenario-based priming are actually effects of simple lexical
priming, or vice versa. These two types of priming could very
well be instantiations of the same underlying process. Both
processes require that information in working memory
activates dormant information in long-term memory
through previously established connections. In case of
scenario priming, the information that generates the infer-
ence, and the knowledge that is in turn activated by that
inference, is more elaborate than in word–word priming, but
the underlying mechanisms of storage and retrieval seem
closely related.
3.3. The role of background information in language
comprehension
Our experiment suggests that both message- and scenario-
based constraints determine the early integration of words
within a discourse. This is consistent with a core assumption
in several models of language comprehension, such as the
Construction-Integration model (Kintsch, 1988, 1998), or the
Scenario-Mapping and Focus theory (Sanford and Garrod,
1998). The assumption is that during comprehension, words
are mapped onto prior discourse in two different ways: a
relatively crude mapping onto potentially relevant scenarios
and other static ‘default’ knowledge structures in long-term
memory (e.g., via an automatic resonance process (Myers and
O' Brien, 1998; Myers et al., 1994)), and a more precise
mapping onto the actual meaning dynamically constructed
for the discourse.
Our findings do not support the idea that scenario- and
message-level information is (always) used in consecutive
stages of integration, as suggested by Sanford and Garrod
(1998). Instead, our results suggest that people can use
scenario- and message-related constraints equally rapidly.
This implication of our findings must be treated with some
caution, for we do not know whether the N400 evoked in the
MS-condition is actually a result of an addition of a message-
based N400 and the scenario-based negativity observed in the
S-biased condition, or a ‘pure’ N400 effect elicited solely by
message-based constraints. Determining this would require
‘message-only’ biased discourses without scenario-based or
other lower level forms of contextual support (which appear
very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to create). Thus, our
data do not allow us to infer whether message- and scenario-
level information can actually be used simultaneously, or
whether strong message-level constraint simply overrides
the scenario-based information. What we can infer is that
strong message-level expectations can be brought to bear on
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absence of strong message-level expectations.
Other ERP studies that focused on the interaction between
contextual constraint and scenario-based (or word–word)
priming have foundmixed results. Evidence for the prevalence
of message-level congruity over lexical association (Van
Petten et al., 1999) has been found, as well as additivity of
these two factors (Van Petten, 1993). In addition, as discussed
in the Introduction, Hoeks et al. (2004) found that scenario-
related information can overrule the actual message of the
discourse. In a recent review Ledoux et al. (2006) state that the
exact interaction of message-level information and lexical
association depends on the amount of constraint imposed by
the message. In a constraining context, effects of lexical
association are overridden by message-level effects, whereas
in a less constraining discourse the effects of lexical associa-
tion are present. The present results suggest that for scenario
andmessage information this could also very well be the case.
The data presented by Hoeks et al. (2004) furthermore suggest
that when the scenario constraint is particularly high, the
effect of message-level information is temporarily dimin-
ished. Recent N400 evidence that listeners momentarily fail to
notice a coherence break when the anomalous word is
scenario-relevant (Nieuwland and Van Berkum, 2005) also
points in that direction. Taken together, the extant ERP data
suggest that both types of information, scenario-based (or
based on lexical association) and message-based, are taken
into account when processing new information, and that the
amount of influence each type of information exerts seems to
depend on the relative amount of constraint it receives from
the context.4. Conclusion
Our first conclusion is that discourse-based N400 effects
cannot completely be attributed to scenario fit (or other
lower level priming mechanisms). The actual message of the
broader discourse plays a significant role in the early proces-
sing of incoming information. Second, message-level fit does
not seem to be the only factor influencing early processing of
words in coherent text. When the message of the discourse
does not generate strong expectations, a clear differential
effect of scenario fit shows up, as a left-dominant negativity
around the same time as the discourse-based N400 effect.
Thus, both the actual message of the context and the scenario
suggested by the ‘bag of words’ in the context can affect early
processing in theN400 latency range, as people read a coherent
text. Third, the different scalp distributions of the ERP effects
observed in the scenario-biased and the message- and
scenario-biased condition suggest that different constellations
of neural generators are involved when incoming information
mismatches constraints based on message-level information
as opposed to when the constraints are based on induced
scenarios. It is clear, from our own experience, that readers
nearly always extract the correct message from a discourse
and our results show that message-dependent processing
begins extremely rapidly. At the same time, however, basic
scenarios play their automatic part in the early stages of
language processing, irrespective of that message.5. Experimental procedure
5.1. Participants
36 Right-handed native speakers of Dutch (27 female partici-
pants, mean age 21, range 18–26 years) took part in the
experiment, as part of a course requirement. None had any
neurological impairment, had experienced neurological
trauma, or used neuroleptics. None of the participants had
participated in the pre-tests conducted during the material
construction phase.
5.2. Materials
The stimuli in this experiment were 160 mini-stories of two
sentences, with the first sentence establishing the discourse
context, followed by the local carrier sentence containing the
critical word. For each item a message- and scenario-biased (or
MS-biased) discourse as well as a scenario-biased (or S-biased)
control discourse was created, both containing the same
scenario-relevant words (see Table 1 and the Appendix for
examples of the stimulus materials). All stories were designed
to suggest a specific message-predictable word right after the
indefinite article in the target sentence (the second sentence)
in the MS-biased condition, but not in the S-biased condition.
In addition, S-biased stories suggested a scenario that favored
the bias-consistent critical word over the bias-inconsistent
one. Across the MS- and S-biased conditions, we refer to the
message/scenario-predictable word as bias-consistent words,
and to the coherent but essentially unpredictable control word
as bias-inconsistent words.
The level of message-level constraint for each of the two
conditions of each critical story was determined in a pencil-
and-paper cloze test, prior to the EEG experiment. In this
pretest, we showed the MS-biased and S-biased mini-stories
up to (and thus not including) the critical word to 66
participants, and asked them to complete the story with the
first thing that came to mind. The two versions of the items
were divided over separate lists, so that a participant never
saw an item inmore than one context condition. For each item
the cloze value (the proportion of participants who filled in the
critical word) for the bias-consistent word and the bias-
inconsistent control word was calculated, in both the MS-
biased and the S-biased condition. Only those items were
selected in which the cloze value for the bias-consistent word
was higher than 0.50 in the MS-biased version of the story and
lower than 0.30 in the S-biased version, with a difference
between these two values of at least 0.25. In the resulting item
set, bias-consistent words had a mean cloze value of 0.77
(sd=0.13) across all MS-biased stories and 0.18 (sd=0.15)
across all S-biased stories. The mean cloze value for corre-
sponding bias-inconsistent control words was 0.04 in both the
MS-biased stories (sd=0.06) and the S-biased stories (sd=0.07).
Bias-consistent and bias-inconsistent wordswerematched
on average length and frequency: the mean length of the
discourse-predictable and control word was respectively 6.2
(sd=2.2) characters and 6.8 characters (sd=2.5), and the mean
frequency for discourse-predictable and control words was
respectively 30.5 (sd=52.6) and 30.3 (sd=65.6) per 1 million, as
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noun and the two words that followed the critical noun in the
second sentencewere identical for each of the four conditions,
and as such did not differ in length or frequency. After the two
identical words that followed the critical noun the remainder
of the story sometimes varied between MS- and S-biased
stories, to avoid coherence breaks at the message level.
The 160 items (40 for each of the four conditions shown in
Table 1) were pseudo-randomly mixed with 80 filler items
addressing an unrelated issue (Van Berkum et al., in press). By
rotating the conditions in this list, three more lists of stimuli
were created. Each of the four lists contained all 160
experimental stimuli, 80 stories in the MS-biased discourse
version and 80 with a S-biased discourse. Half of the 80 MS-
biased items and half of the 80 S-biased items contained the
bias-consistent word, while the remaining 40 ended with a
bias-inconsistent word. Each participant was shown one of
these four lists of stimuli, so that one participant saw all
stories, but never in more than one condition.
5.3. Procedure, EEG recording and analysis
Each participant saw 240 stories, 160 of which were critical for
the current issue. Participants were asked to read for
comprehension and were not required to perform any other
task. The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with 30
electrodes (FP1, FP2, F9, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, F10, FT9, FC5, FC2,
FC6, FC1, FT10, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP5, CP1, Cp2, Cp6, P7, P3, Pz,
P4, P8 and Oz) mounted in an elastic cap, each referenced to
the left mastoid. Blinks and vertical eye movements were
registered by placing an electrode under the left eye, initially
referenced to the left mastoid, but later re-referenced to an
electrode above the left eye (Fp1). Electrode impedance was
kept below 5 kΩ during the experiment. The EEG was
amplified, band-pass filtered at 0.03 0Hz–100 Hz and sampled
with a frequency of 500 Hz.
During the comprehension task the participants sat in a
comfortable chair in a normally lit room. The stimuli were
presented in black 36-point courier new font on a white
background on a fast TFT display (Iiyama TXA 3834 MT)
positioned approximately 80 cm away from the participant.
Before each trial, a fixation cross was shown in the center of
the screen for 2.5 s. Participantswere asked to avoid blinks and
eye movements when the words were presented on screen,
and were encouraged to blink when the fixation cross was
shown. To signal the start of each trial to the participant a
beep sounded 1 s before the onset of the first word.
The stories were then presented word for word. To make
the visual presentation more natural, words were presented
using a Variable Serial Visual Presentation (VSVP) procedure,
in which the presentation time of each non-critical word
varied with its length. Non-critical word duration consisted of
a standard offset of 187ms plus and additional 27ms per letter
(with an upper bound of 10 letters for each word). In the
present experiment, durations varied from 214 ms for a one-
letter word to 450 ms for words consisting of ten or more
letters. The interword interval was always 106 ms. The
presentation of clause-final words preceding a comma was
prolongedwith an additional 200ms. In addition, presentation
time for sentence-final words was extended with an extra293 ms, followed by a 1-s pause until the next sentence began.
These various parameters were based on natural reading
times (Haberlandt and Graesser, 1985; Legge et al., 1997), a
subjective assessment of the naturalness of the resulting
presentation, and technical constraints imposed by the video
refresh rate. Note that to the extent that critical words, or
words close to the critical word, differ in average length, the
above procedure will induce unintended shifts in the ERP
waveforms (particularly the exogenous deflections associated
with visual word onset and offset). To avoid spurious ERP
effects due to these shifts, words whose exogenous compo-
nents fall in the critical EEG epoch (or baseline) should
therefore be equated across the condition on their presenta-
tion time. In the present study, the critical noun and the three
words that followed were presented with a fixed duration of
346ms, based on the average critical word length across all 240
stories in the experiment (6 characters). Participants did not
notice the alternation between completely variable and semi-
fixed word duration presentation within a single story.
The data were re-referenced off-line to the average of right
and left mastoids. Blinks and eye movements were removed
from the data using a procedure based on Independent
Component Analysis (ICA) as described by Jung et al. (2000a,
b). After that the data were segmented, timelocked to the
onset of the critical word, from 500 ms before critical word
onset until 1200 ms after critical word onset. Segments in
which the signal exceeded (−)100 μV and those containing
linear drift that was not related to the onset of the critical word
and exceeded (−) 40 μV were eliminated off-line. Due to the
presence of artifacts, for each of the four conditions about 7%
of the trials were deleted. The remaining trials were normal-
ized by subtracting the mean amplitude in a 200-ms pre-
stimulus interval. For each participant the trials were then
averaged for each of the four conditions, timelocked to the
onset of the word.
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted, using
mean amplitude values computed for each participant and
condition in the 300- to 500-ms N400 window for each
electrode. Univariate F tests with more than one degree of
freedom in the numerator were adjusted by means of the
Greenhouse–Geisser or Huynh–Feldt correction where appro-
priate. Uncorrected degrees of freedom and corrected P-values
are reported in the Results. The results were evaluated in an
overall ANOVA with the factors Context (MS-biased and S-
biased) and Consistency (bias-consistent word and bias-
inconsistent word). To evaluate differences in scalp distribu-
tion of the observed effect, an ANOVA with the factors and
Context, Consistency and Electrode was conducted after the
data were scaled by vector-length (McCarthy andWood, 1985).
Each participant's amplitude value was divided by the square
root of the sum of the squared amplitudes over all electrodes
for each condition of that participant (i.e., the vector-length for
each condition). The nature of significant interactions with
Electrodewas assessed in a quadrant ANOVA crossing Context
and Consistency with a Hemisphere (left/right) and Anterior-
ity (anterior/posterior) factor. Four quadrants were defined: (1)
left-anterior, comprising FP1, F3, F7, F9, FC1, FC5 and FT9; (2)
right-anterior, comprising FP2, F4, F8, F10, FC2, FC6 and FT10;
(3) left-posterior, comprising C3, T7, CP1, CP5, P3 and P7; (4)
right-posterior, comprising C4, T8, CP2, CP6, P4 and P8.
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Appendix A. Four stories from the stimulus set in
the original Dutch version and an approximate




De voetballers vierden de goede afloop van hun wedstrijd in
het café. Ze namen allemaal een biertje/pilsje voordat ze
weer naar huis fietsten.
The football players celebrated their victory in the pub. They
all took a beer/lager before they cycled home again.
S-biased discourse
De voetballers hoopten straks in het café de goede afloop van
hun wedstrijd te vieren. Ze namen allemaal een biertje/pilsje
voordat ze het veld op gingen.
The football players expected to celebrate their victory in the




De cardioloog wist dat zijn jonge patiëntje een transplantatie
nodig had. Hij wachtte op een hart/donor voor het kleine ventje.
The cardiologist knew that his young patient needed a transplant. He
was waiting for a heart/donor for the little fellow.
S-biased discourse
De cardioloog had zijn jonge patiëntje geholpenmet een
transplantatie. Hij wachtte op een hart/donor voor het kleine
tweelingbroertje van het ventje.
The cardiologist had saved his young patient with the transplant he




De vakbondslui waren verontwaardigd over de lage
loonsverhoging. Ze organiseerden een staking/protest vanwege
de slechte werkomstandigheden en belachelijke betaling in de
fabriek.
The union members were outraged by the low raise. They organized a
strike/protest because of the awful working conditions and the
ridiculous payment in the factory.
S-biased discourse
De vakbondslui accepteerden de lage loonsverhoging vanwege de
verontwaardigde directeur. Ze organiseerden een staking/
protest vanwege de slechte werkomstandigheden in de fabriek.
The union members settled for a low raise because of the outraged
director. They organized a strike/protest because of the awful working
conditions in the factory.
Example 4
MS-biased discourse
Iedereen dacht dat Jesse het niet ver zou brengen als kok,maar hij
zette door. Hij werkt nu bij een restaurant/zaak waar vrij veel
beroemde mensen komen en maakt kans op een ster.
Everybody thought that Jesse wouldn't really be successful as a cook, but
he persevered. Now he works at a restaurant/place which is
frequented by the rich and famous and will probably be awarded a
Michelin-star this year.S-biased discourse
Iedereen dacht dat Jesse het ver zou brengen als kok, maar hij
zette niet door. Hij werkt nu bij een restaurant/zaak waar vrij
veel penoze komt, in de bediening.
Everybody thought that Jesse would be very successful as a cook, but he
did not persevere. Now he works at a restaurant/place which is
frequented by the mafia, as a waiter.R E F E R E N C E S
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